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Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer's Semi-Compatibilism 
vs Anti-Fundamentalism 
 
 
My Way is a collection of Fischer’s recent work on moral responsibility which provides 
an excellent overview of the position that he has (with Mark Ravizza) steadily worked 
over the last twenty years or so to develop, clarify and defend – the doctrine he calls 
semi-compatibilism, which combines compatibilism about determinism and moral 
responsibility, with agnosticism about those more traditional varieties of compatibilism 
which assert that determinism is consistent with the existence of alternative possibilities. 
In some ways, indeed, My Way might be regarded as a better route into Fischer’s 
distinctive outlook than Responsibility and Control,1 the 1998 book, jointly authored with 
Mark Ravizza, in which the details of the semi-compatibilist theory are painstakingly 
worked out – for those details are complex, and it can be easy to lose sight of the shape of 
the semi-compatibilist woods while trying to make ones way amongst the very 
considerable number of trees which are required to stake out the territory. The essays 
which constitute My Way provide a somewhat gentler, though perhaps more circuitous 
route through the terrain. Early chapters provide an outline of the position which is less 
burdened by the considerable intricacies demanded by a book which aimed to be a 
complete statement of the ‘official’ version; while later ones, often written in response to 
specific worries or objections, seemed to me to offer more help with understanding how 
it is proposed to deal with the most obvious concerns one might have about the view, 
than does the rather denser presentation of Responsibility and Control. 
                                                 
1 John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
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 A brief sketch of the Fischer view on moral responsibility might go as follows. It 
is deeply implausible that our view of ourselves as morally responsible agents should 
depend for its sustainability upon abstruse considerations to do with the relation between 
physical laws and the events they subsume – whether, for instance, those laws (together 
with ‘initial conditions’) strictly entail the occurrence of those very events, or whether the 
laws are probabilistic only, leaving some leeway for alternative futures. But the question 
whether or not causal determinism is true just is the question what this relationship is 
between laws and initial conditions, on the one hand, and the events that occur in our 
universe, on the other. It would be a very good thing, therefore, if our account of moral 
responsibility were not to imply that it depends for its existence upon the falsity of causal 
determinism. But the arguments for thinking that causal determinism might be 
incompatible with the existence of alternative possibilities are rather strong (in particular, 
Fischer seems to think, some version of Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument might 
well show that determinism cannot coexist with alternative possibilities). It would be 
extremely helpful, therefore, if we were able to show that moral responsibility does not 
require the existence of alternative possibilities. Moreover, Fischer believes, there are no 
compelling reasons to think that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal 
determinism that do not depend on the assumption that moral responsibility requires 
alternative possibilities. If we were able to show that moral responsibility does not 
require alternative possibilities, therefore, we would be well on the way to carving out the 
required space for semi-compatibilism. 
 How might we show that moral responsibility does not require alternative 
possibilities? Fischer’s strategy is to appeal to Frankfurt-style examples. Reflection on 
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these examples, he argues, reveals that what he calls regulative control – the sort of 
control that one only has if one could have done otherwise - is not a necessary condition 
of moral responsibility. All that is required is a less demanding variety of control, which 
he calls guidance control. But, Fischer contends, there is no reason to think that guidance 
control is incompatible with causal determinism. One has guidance control of one’s 
action, roughly speaking, when one’s action is produced by a mechanism which is 
“moderately reasons-responsive”, provided only that the mechanism is “the agent’s own”. 
Detailed accounts are supplied of what it is for a mechanism to be moderately reasons-
responsive, and also of what it is for a mechanism to “belong” to an agent in the relevant 
sense. Parallel accounts are also offered of moral responsibility for the consequences of 
one’s actions, and for omissions. The whole constitutes an admirably thorough and 
careful development of a very distinctive variety of compatibilist thinking – compatibilist 
in the broad sense that it insists that our general view of what we are  -  persons, morally 
responsible agents, creatures with a certain sort of special significance - is compatible 
with causal determinism, even if we are sometimes inclined to claim powers for ourselves 
(e.g. the power to ‘make a difference’) to which, on reflection, we might have to 
renounce our claim, in the event that causal determinism turns out to be true. 
 For someone who (like me) is an incompatibilist about moral responsibility and 
causal determinism, there are several avenues of response available to this semi-
compatibilist line. One might try to insist that the Frankfurt cases do not show what 
Fischer takes them to show, and that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral 
responsibility after all. Or one might try to argue (contra Fischer) that even if alternative 
possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, there are good reasons of some 
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other sort for supposing that moral responsibility is not compatible with causal 
determinism (for example, that we could not be the ultimate originators of anything 
unless causal determinism were false, and that moral responsibility requires this power of 
ultimate origination). Or one might try to combine responses of both these kinds – for one 
might quite reasonably think (as has been argued, for example, by Robert Kane)2 that 
there is more than one reason why moral responsibility is incompatible with causal 
determinism. But such replies as these are bound ultimately to fail to convince, so it 
seems to me, unless they are backed up with some indication of what the incompatibilist 
is to say about the powerful claim which is clearly Fischer’s starting point, and which 
provides his motivation for supposing that some theory with roughly the shape of semi-
compatibilism is likely to be right – that is, the claim that our status as morally 
responsible agents ought not to depend on what Fischer calls “the arcane ruminations – 
and deliverances – of the theoretical physicists and cosmologists” (p.5)  For that point, I 
concede, seems absolutely correct. It just seems preposterous to suppose that anything a 
physicist might report as the ultimate scientific verdict about the nature of the basic 
physical laws which govern the universe, might have the potential to settle the question 
whether or not we truly are morally responsible agents. As Fischer says, “Our 
fundamental nature as free, morally responsible agents should not depend on whether the 
pertinent regularities identified by the physicists have associated with them (objective) 
probabilities of 100% (causal determinism) or, say, 98% (causal indeterminism)” (p. 5). 
And unless this point is properly addressed by the incompatibilist, I suggest, nothing she 
has to say about Frankfurt-style scenarios or ultimate responsibility is likely to be 
completely satisfying. My first objective in this article, therefore, will be to explain why I 
                                                 
2 See The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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believe it is possible for an incompatibilist to side with Fischer on the irrelevance of basic 
physics to the question whether or not we are morally responsible agents – and to sketch 
the shape of the picture of action, causality and levels of explanation which would be 
required to secure the availability of the wanted position for the libertarian. I shall then 
return, in the second half of the article, to consider what might be said specifically about 
Fischer’s claim that Frankfurt-style examples can be used to show that moral 
responsibility does not require alternative possibilities. My suggestion will be that 
Fischer’s failure to see that there is room for an incompatibilist to agree with him about 
the irrelevance of physics to moral responsibility, is related to his inability to discern a 
possible ground for supposing that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral 
responsibility which the Frankfurt cases leave untouched.  
 
(i) Moral Responsibility and Basic Physics 
Let me begin by quoting a little more fully from the paragraph in which Fischer first 
explains the importance for his thinking of the idea that our judgements about moral 
responsibility should be (what he calls) resilient: 
…. our basic status as distinctively free and morally responsible agents should not 
depend on the arcane ruminations – and deliverances – of the theoretical physicists 
and cosmologists. That is, I do not think our status as morally responsible persons 
should depend on whether or not causal determinism is true. (p.5) 
 
I accept the claim made by the first of these sentences. But what I should like to ask is 
whether that must entail accepting the second – whether the casual ‘that is’, with 
which Fischer joins these sentences together, is really justified. Must we accept that 
whether or not causal determinism is true is a question which must be put in the hands 
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of “theoretical physicists and cosmologists”?3  If it is, then evidently enough, an 
incompatibilist must accept that it is ultimately up to the theoretical physicists and 
cosmologists to tell us whether or not it is possible that we are morally responsible 
agents. But perhaps there is room for manoeuvre in the recognition that despite that 
nonchalant ‘that is’, Fischer makes a step in his reasoning here, one which the 
incompatibilist might think to question.  
 If we are to decide who might have the right to tell us whether the doctrine of 
causal determinism is true or not, we are going to have to know what that doctrine 
asserts. Fischer claims that   
the doctrine of causal determinism entails … that for any given time, a complete 
statement of the (temporally genuine or non-relational) facts about that time, 
together with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails every truth as to 
what happens after that time. (p.5) 
 
Let us take this, then, for the time being, as our guide to the question what the thesis of 
causal determinism says. Is it up to physicists to tell us whether or not it is true? It is 
not immediately obvious why it should be. On the face of it, there seems no reason 
why, amongst the “temporally genuine facts” we might not find included (for 
example) certain biological, psychological, sociological, and economic facts, about 
which physicists can claim to have no particular expertise – not to mention a whole 
pile of utterly mundane particularities which belong neither to any scientific nor 
indeed to any other domain of enquiry – such as that there is currently a globe on my 
                                                 
3 It is not immediately obvious to me who Fischer has in mind when he refers here to ‘cosmologists’. In a 
sense, of course, anyone concerned with extremely general questions about the nature of the universe as a 
whole could be regarded as a ‘cosmologist’ – and so it is almost a definitional truth that anyone concerned 
with a doctrine of such great generality as the doctrine of causal determinism would count as a cosmologist. 
But I suspect that Fischer is really thinking of cosmology here as a particular branch of physics – the branch 
which is concerned with such matters as the origin and size of the universe, the nature of the matter it 
contains and of the physical laws which it instantiates. I shall assume in what follows, therefore, that his 
point is simply that it should not be within the remit of physics to settle the question whether or not we are 
morally responsible agents.  
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desk, that my printer is out of ink, that there are no elephants in this room and that my 
favourite colour is green. Neither have we been told why the “laws of nature” are to be 
regarded as entirely the preserve of the physicist; it is not immediately obvious (again, 
without further argument) why some of them might not belong to geology or 
chemistry or biology; or even to psychology or economics or sociology. As stated, 
then, there is no immediate connection between the thesis of causal determinism and 
physics – that connection is going to have to be forged.  
It is not difficult, though, to see how it is that the thought arises that physics 
might be the science uniquely well-placed to judge of the question whether causal 
determinism is true. For the thesis of causal determinism, as Fischer describes it, is 
dependent for its very coherence on our being able to make sense of the suggestion 
that there might be such a thing as the “complete statement” of the “temporally 
genuine” facts about any given time. Not only do we need a workable suggestion as to 
how we are to distinguish a “temporally genuine” fact from a relational one, in such a 
way that we will be able to understand clearly which facts concerning the present fall 
into the set from which the thesis of causal determinism alleges it is in principle 
possible to infer those concerning the future. We also need to be confident that the 
idea of there perhaps being a “complete statement” of the facts about any given time is 
not one of whose undermining we are going to be able to make extremely short 
philosophical work. And this in turn would seem to require that there be a satisfactory 
way of constraining those facts, so that, for example, the fact that there are fewer than 
9065 discrete objects with a mass greater than 1g on my desk at present does not count 
as one of the facts in question (for if that counted, then presumably, the fact that there 
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are fewer than 9066 such objects, and fewer than 9067 … and so on, would also have 
to count, and we would be faced with an infinite number of facts, which seems 
difficult to square with the idea that there might be such a thing as a “complete 
statement” of them).  It is reflection on how we might attempt to deal with such 
difficulties as this that ultimately generates the thought that it is physics which must, 
in the end, answer the question whether or not causal determinism is true. For the idea 
to which we are going to have recourse, presumably, will be the thought that there is a 
finite set of basic facts (perhaps facts, for instance, about the nature and distribution of 
fundamental physical particles) from which such further facts as those about the 
number of objects on my desk weighing more than 1g, might be simply inferred, so 
that we need only mention these basic facts in our “complete statement”, leaving the 
others to follow inexorably. It is this idea which must motivate the thought that 
physicists, in particular, might have some particular expertise to bring to bear on the 
question whether causal determinism is true. If all the facts, however complex, depend 
ultimately on the properties of basic physical particles and the laws which they follow, 
then it would seem that we have to defer to physicists when considering the question 
how the world might conceivably unfold. It is they who will tell us whether or not 
causal determinism is true, for it is they who will tell us whether the laws governing 
these basic physical particles are deterministic, or whether they are probabilistic only, 
leaving scope for multiple unfoldings.  
 But the question is whether everything, at every level, really does depend in 
the way envisaged by this picture on the properties of basic physical particles and the 
laws which they follow. Philosophers are often encouraged to think that believing in 
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the “supervenience” of higher level facts on basic physical ones is a minimum 
requirement for naturalistic sanity in metaphysics. But it is not obvious that 
supervenience, as generally characterised, entails that the evolution of reality over 
time depends (in so far as it depends on anything) only on physical laws. What 
supervenience on the physical is usually said to dictate is that no two worlds which 
were identical in all basic physical respects at a given time t could differ in any 
supervenient respect at that same time t. And one might conceivably concede that, I 
think, while still refusing to accept that the question what makes reality evolve as it 
does over time is a matter only for physicists. Even if one adds to the characterisation 
of supervenience the suggestion that there may not be a change in any supervenient 
property without a change in the ‘base’ properties on which it supervenes, we have not 
yet arrived at the idea that any given supervenient change must depend for its 
explanation upon the subvening one which (if we concede the supervenience of a wide 
range of higher-level properties and changes on physical properties and changes) must 
always accompany it. The direction of explanation might (in some instances) rather be 
the other way about. So far as I can see, it seems to be consistent with the 
supervenience of the “temporally genuine” higher level facts on the lower level 
physical ones, that physical laws are not (even in principle) sufficient to determine the 
state of the world at t2 given its state at t1 – and not just for the standardly-touted 
reason that perhaps some of those physical laws will ultimately be confirmed by 
physicists to be probabilistic. One might just think (as does Nancy Cartwright, for 
example)4 that such physical laws as there are, are narrow in their scope, strictly 
applicable only to the relatively small number of situations that correspond closely to 
                                                 
4 See her The Dappled World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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the physical models which supply those laws with their concrete interpretations, and 
applying only ceteris paribus, even where they do apply. Indeed, in some ways, the 
idea that the evolution of reality over time might depend solely on ‘initial conditions’, 
together with purely physical laws, is a quite extraordinary one. And I do not mean, in 
saying this, to imply that it is extraordinary to believe in physical-causal determinism 
as opposed to physical-causal indeterminism. I mean that it is extraordinary to believe 
either that laws at the lower level entirely determine (as opposed to constrain) the 
development of reality or that these laws “fix the probabilities” concerning how reality 
will evolve, leaving some scope for chance. After all, the evolution of reality is 
profoundly influenced (we tend to think) on a large scale by such things as wars, stock 
market crashes, global warming, revolutions, industrialisation, etc., as well as (on a 
small scale) by the myriad small decisions each of us makes on a daily basis. To 
suppose that the occurrence of any of these sorts of things is no more than the high-
level manifestation of the inevitable workings-out of the consequences of the initial 
conditions at the start of the universe (determinism) – or else of those initial conditions 
and merely probabilistic laws, together with a smattering of chance (indeterminism) - 
is perhaps one of the most astounding things that has ever managed to obtain the status 
of philosophical orthodoxy (though it must be conceded that there is strong 
competition for this title). To believe this would seem to be to consign all sorts of 
factors which it is natural to regard as causally crucial to the realms of the utterly 
epiphenomenal. Nothing really matters, it would appear, in anything other than an 
extremely attenuated sense of ‘matters’, to the unfolding of the world, except the way 
physical reality was in the beginning, the physical laws and (perhaps) chance. How are 
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we to make room, given this picture, for our basic conviction that we matter to that 
unfolding – both individually, through our actions, and as a species, through the 
phenomena to which our activities have given rise – societies, governments, armies, 
businesses, religions, technologies, art, literature, science?  
 There are, of course, many attempts to show that our mattering in all these 
ways is perfectly compatible with everything’s nevertheless being fixed by what goes 
on at the level of the smallest constituents of reality. And I cannot here attempt to 
show that these manoeuvres are bound to be unsuccessful (though I believe that to be 
the case). My point here is fortunately less ambitious than that; I aim only to show 
that there is certainly dialectical space for a certain kind of incompatibilist to concede 
Fischer’s point that it is unacceptable to suppose that the question whether any of us is 
really morally responsible for anything is a matter which physicists will ultimately 
have to settle. For the incompatibilist claims only that causal determinism is 
incompatible with moral responsibility. She need not accept that whether or not causal 
determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. 
That only follows if one accepts a certain picture of the relationship between the 
various ‘levels’ of ontology, explanation and causality - a ‘bottom up’ picture 
whereby the evolution of reality over time is conceded to be determined entirely by 
physical laws (perhaps together with some admixture of chance, if these laws happen 
to be probabilistic only). My suggestion is that this is where the incompatibilist 
should demur. She should insist that there is more than one way in which we can 
conceive of causal determinism’s being false. It might be false (as Fischer imagines) 
because, although it is true that (i) the evolution of reality over time depends entirely 
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on the evolution of physical reality over time, as dictated by purely physical laws, 
nevertheless (ii) those physical laws are indeterministic. But it might also be false 
because (i) it is not true that the evolution of reality over time depends entirely on the 
evolution of physical reality over time, as dictated by purely physical laws and (ii) 
there is, moreover, no other set of laws of nature which, together with the facts at a 
given time t, might be thought to entail the facts at t + 1. And the availability of this 
second means of arguing for the falsity of causal determinism shows that the question 
whether or not it is true is not necessarily a physicist’s question. It only turns into a 
physicist’s question once we decide to return a certain answer to the prior 
metaphysician’s question how we are to conceive the relation between what we are 
used to thinking of, metaphorically, as the levels of reality. The incompatibilist, I 
suggest, ought not to return the answer which delivers the question to the physicists to 
settle. 
 It is not, after all, as though the belief that physical laws neither entirely 
determine the future, nor fix the chances that it will evolve globally in any given way, 
would be an ad hoc resource for an incompatibilist to exploit. For what is at the heart 
of the incompatibilist’s thinking, of course, is the idea that on occasion, a human 
agent can determine how the future will be in certain respects. That thought sits ill 
with the idea that physical laws, together with initial conditions at the start of the 
universe, determine the entire future of that universe (which is, of course, what gives 
the incompatibilist the basic motivation for her incompatibilism). But, as 
compatibilists never tire of pointing out, that thought also sits ill with the idea that 
physical laws fix the chances that a certain future will evolve. What the 
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incompatibilist appears to need is a view which releases us from puppet-like 
enslavement either to deterministic or to indeterministic laws of physics. And that, I 
suggest, is not going to be had on the metaphysical cheap. It requires no less than an 
re-examination of various doctrines concerning the basicness of the physical and the 
universal grip of physical law which we have grown used to thinking of as non-
negotiable.  
It might perhaps be responded by Fischer that it is not much better if our basic 
status as distinctively free and morally responsible agents turns out to depend on the 
arcane ruminations and deliverances of metaphysicians, than that that status should 
depend on the verdicts of the consortium of scientists at Caltech, Stanford and MIT 
whom he at one point imagines announcing the news that (contrary to previous 
received opinion) the equations which govern the universe have turned out to be 
deterministic after all. But it is better – much better. A metaphysician’s ruminations 
concerning such matters as the reach of law, the nature of causality, the relationship 
between levels of explanation, etc., must include considerations deriving from such 
things as the all-but-indisputable fact of agency; the apparent efficacy of factors of a 
social, economic and psychological kind; the role which appears to be played by 
reasons in the generation of human (and other animal) activity - indeed, these very 
things constitute the facts to which she must attempt to make her theories answerable. 
What worries Fischer about views on which moral responsibility depends upon the 
falsity of causal determinism, is the prospect that an expert verdict might be handed 
down from scientists concerning matters which it is indisputably entirely within the 
scope of their discipline to determine – and that we would then just have to live with 
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the consequences for moral responsibility. I agree that this picture of the relationship 
between physics and moral responsibility is utterly untenable. But there is more than 
one way to reject it. One way is to be a semi-compatibilist. Another is to reject the 
fundamentalism5 which would hand such power to the discipline of physics in the 
first place. 
It might be insisted that we still do not know whether causal determinism is 
true, even if, as I have suggested, it is not necessarily down to physicists to tell us 
whether or not it is. And it might be suggested that our status as morally responsible 
agents ought not to depend on the falsity of a thesis we cannot, at present, know to be 
false. But in the new context which is provided by the anti-fundamentalist position, 
this claim seems unreasonable. The anti-fundamentalist incompatibilist believes that 
the apparent existence of free agency (and perhaps other considerations, too) provides 
strong reasons for rejecting the thesis of causal determinism, which she insists must 
be regarded as a metaphysical thesis, not a scientific claim. Perhaps she must concede 
(as must anyone with a modicum of modesty) that she cannot know for sure that she 
is right about this – perhaps it might turn out in the end that she is mistaken, and that 
causal determinism is true after all. But it can hardly be insisted that it is a condition 
of offering a case for believing some proposition p that one know for sure in advance 
that one’s case is watertight. (Of course, it must not be the case that one knows that 
one has made such mistakes, but that is quite a different matter). What the anti-
fundamentalist incompatibilist maintains is that her argument for incompatibilism, 
together with what appear to be the facts about free agency, justify her insistence that 
causal determinism is false. And since she does not suppose that causal determinism 
                                                 
5 I borrow this term from Nancy Cartwright, op cit.  
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is merely a claim about the nature of physical law, this is not an a prioristic punt on 
the deliverances of future scientific theorising, such as Fischer supposes that the 
libertarian must inevitably take. Free agency is not thought of by the non-
fundamentalist incompatibilist as dependent on some (as it were) subterranean truth 
about the ultimate workings of the world. Free agency, on her view, just makes causal 
determinism false, straightforwardly and directly. It is a counterexample to the thesis. 
Where it occurs, she insists, something happens in the world (something which, 
according to her preference, she might call a decision, a choice, a volition or an 
action) which was not determined by the conditions at any preceding time together 
with the laws of nature. And though she concedes that it might turn out that she is 
wrong about this (on general grounds of fallibilism), she does not think she needs to 
wait on physics for the confirmation of her verdict. For physics, on her view, contains 
no laws of the all-embracing, world-dominating sort that might rule out the possibility 
of such a thing as a causally undetermined decision, choice or action. Physics is just 
that – physics – and in the anti-fundamentalist’s opinion, it has nothing much to say, 
and never will have, about the provenance of actions. 
Nevertheless, even if logical space is available for an incompatibilism which 
does not concede to physics the ultimate verdict on the question whether or not we are 
morally responsible agents, the view I have sketched is likely to be regarded a radical 
view. It requires that we reject a ‘bottom up’ picture of reality with which many 
philosophers have grown comfortable and to which it might be difficult to work out a 
coherent alternative. It might demand that we be able to make sense of notions that 
philosophers have struggled to clarify and often rejected out of hand – such as 
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‘downward causation’, for instance. Surely semi-compatibilism is the better option! I 
want now to try to explain why I do not think this is the case – and why, therefore, I 
believe that anti-fundamentalism, and not semi-compatibilism, is the way to go for 
someone who believes, as Fischer and I both do, that the question whether we are 
morally responsible agents is not one which is ever going to be settled by physics.  
 
(ii) The Importance of Alternative Possibilities 
Semi-compatibilism rests, ultimately, on the idea that we can give an account of the 
powers distinctive of agency without recourse to the idea that an agent must have real 
access, at the very moment of her action, to alternate possibilities. Fischer relies for 
his explication of how this is possible on the contrast between what he calls regulative 
control, on the one hand, and guidance control on the other. Moral responsibility, he 
alleges, requires only guidance control; and he illustrates the distinction between the 
two kinds of control with an example: 
… moral responsibility does not require regulative control. To see this, suppose you 
are at the controls of an airplane, a glider, and you are guiding the plane to the west. 
Everything is going just as you want, and the plane is making good headway. You 
consider whether to steer the plane to the east, but you decide to keep guiding it to the 
west, in part because the scenery is nicer in the west. Unknown to you, the wind 
currents in the area are such that the plane would continue to go to the west, in just the 
way it actually goes, even if you had tried to steer it in some other direction. … In this 
example, you steer the plane to the west in the “normal” way. It is not just that you 
cause it to go to the west (which you would equally have done had you steered the 
plane in the same way as the result of a sneeze or an epileptic seizure). Rather, you 
guide the plane in a distinctive way – you exhibit a signature sort of control which I 
shall call “guidance control”. Here, you exhibit guidance control of the plane’s 
movements, but you do not possess regulative control over the plane’s movements 
(p.8). 
 
What is the role of this example supposed to be? It cannot be intended as a 
straightforward counterexample to the claim that moral responsibility requires 
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regulative control – as might perhaps be confusingly suggested by the way in which 
Fischer introduces it (“ … moral responsibility does not require regulative control. To 
see this …”). For it does not follow from the fact that I do not possess regulative 
control over the plane’s movements under the circumstances envisaged that I do not 
possess regulative control, in these same circumstances, over a great many other 
things – notably, perhaps, in this case, over the movements of my own body. I can 
push levers this way and that; press buttons (or not); even desert the cockpit 
altogether and leave the plane to its own devices. And it might be that my moral 
responsibility for the plane’s movements ultimately depends in this case on my 
possession of regulative control over these other matters. Fischer himself, indeed, 
seems to recognise that the case does not succeed in proving that moral responsibility 
does not require regulative control – for after presenting it, together with another 
example of Locke’s, he asks: “Do such examples show that one can be morally 
responsible for some behavior, even though one lacks freedom to choose or do 
otherwise, that is, lacks regulative control?” And he responds thus: “The problem is 
that, apart from any special assumptions, such as causal determinism, it is plausible to 
suppose that you could have chosen to steer the plane in a different direction, tried to 
do so, pushed the steering apparatus in a different way, and so forth” (p.9). It appears, 
then, that Fischer himself does not regard the plane case as a counterexample to the 
claim that moral responsibility requires regulative control. The idea must be, then, 
that it is supposed to be simply an illustration of how it might be possible to have one 
kind of control (guidance control) over something (in this case, the plane’s 
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movements), while lacking control of another kind (regulative control) over that same 
thing.  
It seems reasonable to suppose that the example really does illustrate that one 
can exercise a certain sort of control (the sort that Fischer calls guidance control)  
with respect to the movements of a certain thing without it being within one’s power, 
due to certain counterfactual truths, to alter those movements in any way. But if moral 
responsibility is to be compatible with causal determinism, and we are to work, as 
Fischer wishes us to, on the assumption that causal determinism rules out alternative 
possibilities, it must be shown that an agent’s being morally responsible for 
something is compatible with her lacking regulative control not just over that same 
something, but with her lacking regulative control over anything whatever. If the 
universe is causally deterministic, no agent ever has any regulative control over 
anything, for regulative control is defined as a kind of control which requires genuine 
access to alternative possibilities. As Fischer notes, “causal determinism would 
extinguish not just a prairie fire of freedom, but also the tiniest flicker” (p.41). And 
the question arises, therefore, whether moral responsibility can exist in the complete 
absence of the phenomenon Fischer calls regulative control. This is what must be 
shown by the semi-compatibilist who wishes to carry conviction. 
 How might this be shown? The trouble is, as Fischer is well aware, that it is 
well nigh impossible to construct a case based on the sort of counterfactual scenario 
that is imagined in the airplane case (“If I had tried to guide the plane to the east, it 
would still have gone to the west”) which has the structure Fischer really needs for his 
argument – a case in which an agent acts, and in which it seems intuitively right to 
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regard her as morally responsible for what she does, but in which all alternative 
possibilities whatever are blocked by the truth of certain counterfactual propositions. 
Admittedly, most alternative possibilities are ruled out by the sorts of cases which 
have come to be known as ‘Frankfurt-style’ examples – and it is indeed to these cases 
that Fischer looks for the basis of his argument. In a Frankfurt-style example, we are 
asked to imagine an agent (call him Jones) whose thought processes are constantly 
monitored by a second agent (call him Black), who wants Jones to act in a particular 
way – say, to vote for Clinton. Should Jones show any signs of being tempted not to 
vote for Clinton (let us suppose, for example, that he would blush just prior to the 
onset of any decision to vote for another candidate, and that Black knows this), Black 
would intervene neurologically, to ensure that Jones votes for Clinton in any case. But 
in the event, there is no need for an intervention on Black’s part. Jones just freely 
votes for Clinton in the normal way. We are invited to agree that in such a case, Jones 
is morally responsible for his action. And we are invited to agree also that he does 
not, under such circumstances, have regulative control over his action – since, given 
Black’s presence, the structure of his motivations and his powers,  Jones could not 
have done other than he did. But Fischer concedes that even under such unfavourable 
circumstances as are here envisaged, certain alternative possibilities appear to remain 
open to Jones. Jones could, for example, have shown a sign that he was about to be 
tempted to decide not to act in the way desired by Black (thus triggering Black’s 
intervention) or he could, perhaps, have refrained from acting in the wanted way on 
his own. Frankfurt-style cases of this variety cannot be used straightforwardly, then, 
to show that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for what she does 
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even though no alternative possibilities are available to her at all. Fischer’s strategy is 
instead to argue that at any rate, these Frankfurt-style cases rule out all alternative 
possibilities which might conceivably be relevant to the question whether or not the 
agent is morally responsible. He insists that it is completely implausible to suppose 
that any of the alternative possibilities which remain open to the agent in a Frankfurt-
style case could be the sorts of alternative possibilities which might ground the 
judgement that the agent was morally responsible for the action he in fact undertakes. 
The alternative possibilities in question, he insists, are mere ‘flickers’ of freedom, 
which are insufficiently robust to make the difference between a case in which an 
agent is, and one in which she is not, judged morally responsible for what she does. 
And given that that is so, he concludes, it is reasonable to maintain that the Frankfurt 
cases do indeed show that moral responsibility does not depend upon alternative 
possibilities. 
 But not all the alternative possibilities that Fischer is inclined to dismiss as 
mere ‘flickers’ of freedom seem equally unimportant. Let us consider some of them. 
One is the alternative that is represented by the possibility that Jones might have 
blushed (thereby triggering Black’s intervention). I agree with Fischer that it is most 
implausible that the incompatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility is 
going to be able to make anything much of the existence of this alternative possibility. 
The reason is this: that any plausible, non-question-begging principle relating moral 
responsibility to the existence of alternative possibilities is surely going to have to 
relate to the need for the agent to have certain powers if she is to be held morally 
responsible for what she does. And even if a certain openness is present in the 
 21
Frankfurt case envisaged, in virtue of which we are inclined to say that Jones might 
have blushed, thereby triggering Black’s response, this does not seem to be an 
openness that is attributable, in any way, to a power possessed by Jones. Blushing, as 
it is supposed to figure in the example, is meant to be conceived of as an involuntary 
business – it isn’t up to Jones whether he blushes or not – and therefore it seems 
implausible to suppose that the possibility that he might have done could help to show 
that he is morally responsible for voting for Clinton.  
But not all of the alternative possibilities which Fischer writes off as mere 
‘flickers’ are like this. One possibility which seems to be open to Jones, for example, 
and which genuinely does appear to constitute a power of his, is this: he is able not to 
perform the particular action of voting for Clinton that he does in fact perform. It is 
very plausible that when Black intervenes, what he produces cannot be an event 
identical with the action that Jones actually undertakes when he freely votes for 
Clinton. Indeed, it might be argued that Jones has it in his power not to perform an 
action of voting for Clinton at all – for one might reasonably ask what reason there is 
to suppose that a chain of events which is initiated by Black might count, 
nevertheless, as an action on the part of Jones. Fischer’s response to some rather 
similar suggestions that have been made by others in the literature leads me to believe 
that he would respond to this suggestion by saying that such possibilities as these 
remain too slender, too exiguous, to be relevant to the question of moral 
responsibility. But it seems to me that Fischer is wrong about this, for a reason I shall 
now attempt to explain.6
                                                 
6 I give a fuller account of this argument in ‘Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom’, forthcoming ??. 
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 In assessing the question just how ‘robust’ an alternative possibility has to be 
before it is relevant to the question whether or not an agent is morally responsible for 
what she does, I think it is essential to distinguish between two quite different sorts of 
reason one might have for supposing that moral responsibility might require 
alternative possibilities. Many philosophers who have supposed that alternative 
possibilities are required for moral responsibility assume that the connection depends 
on a principle, essentially, of fairness  - the basic intuition being that it is simply not 
fair to hold an agent morally responsible for φ-ing, say, when she simply could not 
have done other than φ. And if this is the basis on which one hopes to justify one’s 
belief in the claim that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, it 
might indeed seem as though the sorts of possibilities which I have alleged might be 
available to Jones are much too flimsy to be relevant to the question whether or not he 
may be held morally responsible for voting for Clinton. For the power not to perform 
the particular action one undertakes seems often to be available to agents of just the 
sort that one might hope the appropriate fairness principle would excuse. A heroin 
addict, for instance, who injects heroin into her right arm at t might have been able to 
wait a couple of seconds and inject the heroin at t + 2 instead; or might have been 
able to inject methadone instead of heroin; or might have been able to inject the 
heroin into her left arm rather than her right; and in virtue of these powers, might be 
said to have had the power, at t, to refrain from performing the particular action she 
did in fact perform. But how could such apparently unimportant little powers as these 
give her the sort of control which would make it fair for us to judge her morally 
responsible for her action? Such a suggestion would surely be ludicrous. It is perhaps 
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not clear to what extent a heroin addict ought to be judged morally responsible for a 
given act of heroin injection – but it is surely clear enough, it might be said, that the 
answer does not depend on the availability of such exiguous possibilities as those 
mentioned above. 
But one need not suppose that it is a principle of fairness which most crucially 
relates moral responsibility to alternative possibilities. One might rather think that the 
deepest and most important reason why alternative possibilities are required for moral 
responsibility is that they are required for agency ( agency being, in its turn, a 
necessary condition of moral responsibility). For one might believe (particularly, of 
course, if one is a libertarian) that actions are events of a very special sort. Properly 
understood, the libertarian might insist, bodily actions are not mere bodily movements 
– rather, they are the causings of bodily movements by agents.7 And in order for a 
movement to count as having been caused by an agent (as opposed to a mere process 
internal to that agent’s body), she may say, that movement will have to have been the 
product of an exercise of what Reid called a two-way power on the part of that agent – 
to act, or to refrain from acting – so that in the absence of the relevant power of 
refrainment a genuine action simply could not occur. And for someone who holds this 
view, the power of refrainment that is crucial to the question whether an agent who φ-
s on a given occasion in fact acted on that occasion is not the power not to have φ-ed 
(as indeed Frankfurt-style cases show rather clearly – for we retain the strong intuition 
in those cases that the agent acted, despite lacking the power not to have φ-ed). The 
                                                 
7 For simplicity of exposition, I ignore purely ‘mental’ actions – such as conjuring up a mental image of the 
Eiffel Tower, or adding 23 and 49 in one’s head - though it seems to me not impossible that one might 
think of arguing that these actions, too, are essentially constituted by an agent’s causing certain bodily 
events (presumably ones that occur, in this case, in the brain). 
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power of refrainment that is relevant seems rather to be a power that is, as it were, 
internal to the particular action which was in fact performed – the power not to have 
performed it – a power that could have been, but in the event was not, exercised by 
the agent at the time of the action. The existence of this power, on this view, is what 
makes it correct to say that the action was an action – and in the libertarian’s opinion, 
it will always be crucial to what Fischer calls ‘the signature sort of control’ that we 
find to be present in the activities of the pilot guiding the plane to the west. Where an 
agent lacks the power to refrain from the particular φ-ing she in fact undertakes, on 
this view, her φ-ing on that occasion cannot be thought of as an exercise of agency at 
all – it is a mere event, over the occurrence of which it is inconceivable that the agent 
should have any control. And against the background of this line of thinking, 
Fischer’s claim that the power to refrain from undertaking a particular course of 
action is too exiguous to ‘ground’ moral responsibility loses its power. For on this 
view, the power to refrain is relevant in a way different from that imagined by Fischer 
– it is not supposed to ‘ground’ moral responsibility directly, by supplying a condition 
that any morally responsible agent must meet if it is to be fair that she is held morally 
responsible for what she has done. Rather, it is conceived of simply as a necessary 
condition of any genuine exercise of agency. It is a necessary condition, moreover, 
that Frankfurt-style agents appear to meet. But the incompatibilist will want to insist 
that it is not a necessary condition that could be met if causal determinism were true. 
And therefore she will disagree with Fischer’s verdict that Frankfurt-style cases can 
be used to show that alternative possibilities are not necessary for moral 
responsibility. For Frankfurt-style agents retain what she regards as the most crucial 
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alternative-possibility-involving power there is – which is simply the (two-way) 
power to act. 
It might be retorted that it is simply not plausible that an action is, by its very 
nature, a kind of event which is inconsistent with the truth of causal determinism. I 
want next to consider three possible arguments for this claim. I shall argue that none 
is satisfactory – and that all are, in a way, connected with the failure to take seriously 
the possibility that is made available by the anti-fundamentalist line I considered in 
section (i). 
 
(iii)  The Nature of Actions 
Fischer assumes, as do many participants in the contemporary debate about free will 
(including many incompatibilist participants) that there is nothing about action per se 
which is inconsistent with causal determinism. But this has always seemed to me a 
strange assumption. When I imagine the universe as it is alleged to be by the causal 
determinist, a place in which each event follows inexorably from immediately 
preceding circumstances according to all-embracing laws of nature, it seems to me 
that that universe permits no space for the phenomenon of action at all. It is a world of 
mere events in which there seems to be no place of the sort where an agent might 
interpose herself and make a difference to what then occurs. The compatibilist, 
doubtless, will want to argue that the idea that an agent needs such a ‘place’ to 
interpose herself into the series of events is an unnecessary and possibly even 
incoherent one – that an agent’s interpositions must simply form a special subset of 
the networks of deterministically related events which she envisages as constituting 
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causal reality. But that the suggestion is largely absent even from contemporary 
presentations of incompatibilist arguments seems to me curious. Even agent 
causationists, who are likely to agree that one cannot think of what they call the free 
actions of an agent merely as events which occur either inexorably, or with a certain 
determinate degree of probability, in consequence of previous ones, often concede 
that there are, nevertheless, many actions of lesser importance which are indeed 
merely the deterministic consequences of prior conditions. To concede this, though, is 
to cut oneself off, so it seems to me, from a powerful idea – the idea, that is, that 
actions might be metaphysically distinctive simply in virtue of being actions. It is to 
cut oneself off from the prospect of a unified account of actions, which might relate 
the role of the agent, the concept of a two-way power, and the correspondingly 
distinctive profile of the events which are actions, in an illuminating way. Why, then, 
have philosophers been so reluctant to entertain the possibility that actions per se 
might be inconsistent with causal determinism? 
There are, I think, at least three important factors which have conspired to 
prevent many contemporary philosophers (Fischer included) from seeing that a 
challenge to compatibilism might be mounted on the basis of the simple claim that 
causal determinism is inconsistent with agency. Of these, the most important, I think, 
is the assumption which I have already challenged in the first part of this paper, that 
causal determinism is a doctrine which might, for all we know, be true. Given that 
assumption, the suggestion that agency and causal determinism are incompatible is 
likely to seem preposterous. Surely, it might be said, we cannot accept a view 
according to which, for all we know, there might not be agents, or actions, at all! 
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Surely we know (at least roughly) how to distinguish agents from non-agents, and 
actions from non-actions, and would continue to be able to do so even if the physicists 
at Caltech told us that causal determinism was true! But as I have already tried to 
argue, one need not accept this claim that the question whether causal determinism is 
true is a question we must leave to be settled by the physicists. We might instead 
suppose that a proper understanding of what actions are already falsifies the doctrine 
of causal determinism. And that prospect is only bewildering to someone who has 
already embraced fundamentalism. With causal determinism recognised for the 
exceedingly heavy metaphysical commitment I believe it to be, it should no longer 
seem extraordinary that we might hope to refute it by means of careful reflection on 
some of our other, and arguably less negotiable, metaphysical commitments. 
The second important factor which has conspired to help cover up the 
possibility of an incompatibilism based solely on a metaphysical view of agency as 
the exercise of a two-way power, is the part which has been played in the debates 
surrounding moral responsibility and alternative possibilities by a range of real and 
imaginary addicts, neurotics, compulsives, phobics, etc. – whose problematic 
behaviours are thought of potentially excusable on the grounds that the agents in 
question ‘could not have done otherwise’.  It is held, quite reasonably, though, that it 
is most implausible to suppose that none of this problematic behaviour counts as a 
manifestation of the phenomenon of action. Surely, then, it is inferred, we must accept 
that there can be causally determined actions, and having accepted that, ought to turn 
swiftly to the important business of explaining what might be the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of those distinctively free actions for which we may truly be held 
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morally responsible. But is it really right to suppose that these cases show that there 
can be causally determined actions? Perhaps it might be causally determined that an 
alcoholic, say, might not be able to resist drinking (within a certain time period) the 
remains of a bottle of whisky left out in plain view in an easily accessible place. But 
the particulars of the action, or actions, involved will still be up to the alcoholic – 
where exactly to drink the whisky, and how quickly, and whether from the bottle or 
from a glass, and beginning right now or slightly later, diluted with water or not at all, 
etc., – and so surely we might insist that the action itself, considered as a particular 
event, was not a causally determined occurrence, but rather a genuine exercise of the 
distinctive two-way power of agency, as all true actions must be. That the occurrence 
of a certain behaviour-type has absolutely no chance of not occurring within a certain 
time-frame under certain conditions, does not imply that the token action which 
constitutes its actual occurrence was a causally determined event. Only where there 
are real reasons to insist that none of the particulars of some supposed ‘action’ was up 
to the agent – that he had no control over where, when, how or whether that action 
occurred –  is it truly clear that it is wrong to suppose that what occurred really was an 
action – rather than merely an event in whose occurrence the agent played no 
meaningful role at all. Of course, if one is looking for a power of refrainment on the 
basis of which one might consider excusing such an agent for what he has done, the 
power to refrain from undertaking a given particular action is going to be far too 
flimsy. But that (as I have already argued) is not the only way in which a power of 
refrainment might figure in an argument for the view that causal determinism is 
inconsistent with moral responsibility. If one supposes that the power of refrainment 
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is important rather as a necessary condition of agency itself, it need not also function 
as the basis on which moral responsibility is withheld in these difficult cases.  
A third reason for supposing that there is nothing about the idea of action per 
se which presupposes indeterminism, I think, is the very natural thought that many 
non-human animals can act. But this will only seem to present problems for a view of 
agency as essentially involving the exercise of two-way powers if one supposes that 
non-human animals cannot exercise such powers. And why should one suppose this? 
It is no doubt true that appeal to such phenomena as instinct will have to play a large 
role in the explanation of a great deal of animal activity. But what an instinct explains 
is generally why a certain type of behaviour occurs. It does not follow that an 
animal’s execution of the actions required to comply with instinctual necessities must 
be conceived of as a series of deterministically produced events. One might rather 
suppose that just as we humans are sometimes unable to refrain from types of activity 
which nevertheless constitute our actions, in virtue of the fact that we can settle such 
matters as when, how and where, precisely, those actions will occur, so those higher 
animals to which we might wish to accord the power of agency generally retain 
control over many of the specifics of the activities in which they are at the same time 
(in a general way) instinctively compelled to engage – and that it is in virtue of that 
control that we are inclined to interpret their movements as the results of actions in 
the first place. For example, a cow is doubtless not free to refrain from grazing in the 
lush field in which she has been placed. But it does not follow that she cannot 
determine in which part of the field, exactly, she will choose first to graze; or interrupt 
her activity to lie down for a while; or settle which side of her mouth she will use to 
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chew the next mouthful of grass. Of course, in some of these cases, there will likely 
be reasons which help to explain why she chooses as she does. But as with a human 
agent, we might want to resist the idea that the existence of such reasons amounts to 
the existence of a deterministic cause of the movements of the cow. 
It seems to me, then, that none of these arguments for supposing that the 
existence of actions has to be regarded as compatible with the thesis of causal 
determinism is at all compelling. It is obvious how the assumption of fundamentalism 
figures in the first argument. But it plays a role, I should argue, also in the second and 
third. For it encourages us, in considering the causal provenance of the actions of 
these non-responsible agents – the addicted, phobic and compulsive on the one hand, 
and those non-human animals to which we might want to accord agency, on the other 
- to focus exclusively on the complex chains of internal, neurophysiological, electrical 
and chemical events, which culminate eventually in the bodily movements of these 
agents – and to forget the ways in which we ordinarily conceptualise such activity as 
the exercise of power on the part of the individual agent concerned. And in so far as 
these two pictures of a movement’s causal antecedents might look to be 
irreconcileable with one another, moreover, fundamentalism encourages us to think 
that the second must give way to the first. But anti-fundamentalism challenges that 
idea. It proposes that we make room for the suggestion that causality comes in many 
shapes and sizes, that it operates at many levels, and that all kinds of different objects 
(not just microphysical ones) may be the bearers of distinctive causal powers. The 
possibility arises, therefore, that agency might just be one of these distinctive types of 
power, one with its own enormously important place in the messy patchwork of 
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disparate phenomena which constitutes causal reality – not one which has to be made 
to fit into a world conceived of merely as a vast quantity of homogeneous particles 
blindly obeying physical laws. And if that were so, it would not be obvious that 
agents (or their powers) would simply have to dissolve, on inspection, into the flux of 
small things.  
It seems to me, then, that anti-fundamentalism, rather than semi-
compatibilism, provides the best hope for someone wishing to save moral 
responsibility from the threat presented by physics. Nevertheless, the difference 
between Fischer’s view and my own should not be over-estimated. In particular, I 
think we ought to agree with Fischer that the whole ‘alternative sequence’ in which 
Black intervenes and brings it about that Jones votes for Clinton in any case is entirely 
irrelevant to the question whether or not Jones is responsible for what he does in the 
actual scenario – what matters is indeed, as Fischer maintains, only what happens in 
what he calls the ‘actual sequence’. Where I differ from Fischer is only in my 
insistence that the question what does happen in the actual sequence is not 
independent of the question whether the agent has any alternative possibilities – for 
unless she possesses the power to refrain from the particular action she undertakes, I 
maintain, the actual sequence cannot constitute the occurrence of an action. I want to 
end with some brief reflections on Fischer’s own conception of what is required of an 
actual sequence if it is to amount to an action for which an agent might be morally 
responsible. 
As I see it, the tensions implicit in Fischer’s attempt to make agency 
altogether independent of alternative possibilities surface eventually in the difficulties 
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he faces in attempting to clarify the second component of his account of guidance 
control – the need for the reasons-responsive mechanism which generates the agent’s 
action to be ‘the agent’s own’. This second component is required in the first place 
because, as Fischer puts it, “one might exhibit the right sort of reasons-responsiveness 
as a result (say) of clandestine, unconsented-to electronic stimulation of the brain (or 
hypnosis, brainwashing, and so forth)” (p.18). But it is extremely difficult for 
someone in Fischer’s position to offer a satisfactory account of what it is for a 
mechanism to be ‘the agent’s own’ which will solve the problem of manipulation. On 
the one hand, he is not allowed to make any irreducible reference in his account of the 
generation of morally responsible forms of action to such things as the agent or her 
distinctive powers – since he is seeking an account which is entirely compatible with 
causal determinism thought of as a view about the event-causal determination of 
everything that occurs by purely physical laws, and it is plausible to suppose that no 
unreduced agents or such peculiar things as two-way powers could figure in such an 
account. On the other hand, any mere chain of events and circumstances, whatever it 
contains, and however complex it may be, would seem to be potentially reproducible 
in all its complex entirety by a manipulative agent, so that whatever set-up is offered 
by Fischer as being allegedly sufficient for the exercise of guidance control would 
seem to be open to the objection that that very set-up might itself be brought into 
existence (and maintained) by the manipulative agent – in which case, once again, it 
might seem that the manipulated agent could not be truly morally responsible for 
actions resulting from the set-up. For instance, Fischer’s own suggestion that the 
mechanism on which one acts becomes “one’s own” in virtue of one’s having certain 
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beliefs about one’s own agency and its effects in the world, seems obviously 
vulnerable to the objection that such beliefs could perfectly well be induced, 
alongside the original manipulative activity, by the manipulative agent. In that case, it 
would seem to be possible that I should have all the beliefs in question, and yet be 
simply deluded. All my actions are in fact merely the result of decisions made by the 
manipulative agent, and yet I take it that I have effects in the world and that I am an 
apt target for the reactive attitudes. Surely, if there is a genuine worry about 
manipulation in the first place, adding in such extra beliefs as these is not going to be 
enough to solve it. A compatibilist would do better, in my view, simply to bite the 
bullet and insist that mere reasons-responsiveness of the relevant mechanism is 
sufficient for moral responsibility, however counterintuitive that may at first appear to 
be.   
It appears to me, moreover, that this same basic difficulty is going to infect 
any view which fails to assign actions the sort of metaphysically exceedingly 
distinctive nature I have been insisting they must have. Any view which descends 
from the level of agents to the level of such things as mechanisms, processes and 
events is going to face the problem that any mechanism, process or event which 
occurs inside an agent can be set in train by someone, or something, which is not the 
agent. Only if one accepts that an action is essentially the exercise of a power by the 
agent whose action it is can this difficulty possibly be avoided.  
I do not say that it is going to be easy to develop the wanted account of actions 
within an acceptably naturalistic framework. My guess is that we are going to need to 
work hard to make better sense than we have so far made of notions like downward 
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causation and emergence; to make full use of the intellectual resources that appear to 
be emerging within such fields as complexity theory and systems biology; and to 
make better links than we have so far forged between the topic of consciousness and 
that of free will. But neither do I see any reason for supposing that it is bound to be 
impossible – provided we are willing to reject the position that I have been calling 
fundamentalism. Actions are natural phenomena, and so are agents. Our first step in 
understanding how they are possible should be the rejection of the idea that mere 
physics is what exclusively governs the unfolding of the world from one moment to 
the next. 
 
 
        Helen Steward 
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